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1I. Introduction: Trade and Development
The facilitation of economic development has become an essential issue in the discussion 
of world trade today.1  The increased participation of developing countries in the world 
trading system, comprising currently two-thirds of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership, has brought more attention to the issue of trade and development.2   This 
issue has become an important agenda in the WTO; the WTO Agreement3 sets out the 
facilitation of development in its objectives,4 and the first WTO Ministerial Conference 
addressed the importance of integrating developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system by assisting with their economic development.5 The current Doha Round also 
includes a development agenda (Doha Development Agenda: DDA), addressing important 
issues of trade and development, such as debt and finance; trade and transfer of 
technology; technical cooperation and capacity building; least-developed countries 
(LDCs); and special and differential treatment.6
1
 The author’s forthcoming book, “Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System” 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005) discusses the impact of the current 
regulatory framework for international trade on economic development.
2
 The participation of developing countries in the world trading system began in the 
previous GATT regime. See Robert Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal 
System, Thames Essays (Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 1987) for a discussion of 
how the GATT as an institution came to accommodate the increasing involvement of 
developing countries in the world trading system.
3 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. WTO, The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge University 
Press, reprint 2003), at 4-14.
4 Its preamble provides in relevant part, “Recognizing further that there is need for positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development.”  Id., at 4.
5 To facilitate this integration, “… the WTO Agreement embodies provisions conferring 
differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries, including special 
attention to the particular situation of least-developed countries.” WTO, Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, WTO doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC (December 18, 1996), para. 13.
6
 WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (November 20, 2001).   
2With a majority of the world population, mostly in developing countries, in poverty, the 
relief of this human tragedy is one of the most pressing issues of our time.7  The only long-
term solution to this problem is to create economies in these developing countries through 
economic development that will provide their population with higher standards of living.  
Trade can play an essential role in the facilitation of economic development.8  A group of 
developing countries in East Asia, namely, the newly industrializing (now industrialized) 
countries (“NICs”), such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have 
achieved splendid economic development in a few decades using active export facilitation. 
The NICs have brought themselves out of poverty by successful economic development.9
7
 In 2000, the United Nations estimated that over half the world's six billion people live 
under substantial deprivation, surviving on incomes equivalent to $2 dollars or less per 
day.  To address the question of poverty, the United Nations set the “Millennium
Development Goals” (MDG) with several development objectives.
 <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
8
 A large body of literature discusses the contribution of trade on development including: 
World Trade Organization, “Symposium on Trade and Development”, Focus, March 1999, 
at 6-9; J. Riedel, “Trade as an Engine of Growth in Developing Countries, Revisited”, 
Economic Journal, March 1984, at 56-73; Larry E. Westphal, “Industrial Policy in an 
Export Propelled Economy: Lessons From South Korea's Experience” (in Symposia: The 
State and Economic Development) (1990) 4(3) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 41-
59; R. Nurkse, “Pattersn of Trade and Development” in R. Nurkse (ed.), Problems of 
Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries and Patters of Trade and Development
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1970), at 163-226; K. Krishna, A. Ozylidrim, and 
N.R. Swanson, “Trade, Investment, and Growth”, NBER Working Paper No. 6861, 
December 1998; J.A. Frankel and D. Romer, “Trade and Growth: An Empirical 
Investigation”, NBER Working Paper 5476, March 1996; D. Salvadore and T. Hatcher, 
“Inward Oriented and Outward Oriented Trade Strategies”, Journal of Development 
Studies, April 1991, at 7-25.
9
  These four economies have achieved rapid economic development since the 1960s.  
Between 1961 and 1996, South Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased by an 
average of 9.80 per cent per annum, Hong Kong by 9.58 per cent, Taiwan by 10.21 per 
cent and Singapore by 9.95 per cent.  The growth of exports from the NICs, fueled by their 
rapid industrial growth, was phenomenal during their development.  For instance, during 
1980-1990, exports from South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore grew at the 
average annual rates of 12.0%, 8.9%, 14.4%, and 10.0%, respectively. 
3Trade promotion, particularly export facilitation, is an important part of development 
strategy and needs to be supported by the WTO.
The regulatory framework for international trade, currently represented by the WTO, 
affects the ability of developing countries to adopt trade-related development policies.10
The author examined whether the current regulatory framework for international trade 
facilitates the economic development of developing countries,11 and this examination 
revealed the inadequacy of the current system.  The author proposed alternative provisions 
to better facilitate development and briefly introduced the need for new regulatory 
treatment of development facilitation, tentatively called the “Agreement on Development 
Facilitation” (ADF) and for a new body within the WTO to oversee trade and development 
issues, namely “the Council for Trade and Development.” (the Council)12  This paper, 
reiterating the need for the ADF and the Council, takes the next step and provides a more 
detailed account of the possible elements of the ADF and the role of the proposed Council. 
Section II provides a discussion of the current development-assistance provisions in the 
WTO, as well as the current organizational apparatus with an examination of the 
effectiveness of the current provisions and organizational structure in facilitating 
development.  Based on this examination, a case for the Council and ADF is made.  Then, 
10
 For instance, the prohibition of export and import-substitution subsidies under the 
current subsidy rules deprives developing countries of the ability to adopt these subsidies 
for the purpose of development.  For further discussions, see Y.S. Lee, supra note 1, 
chapter 3.
11 Supra note 1.  See also Y.S. Lee, “Facilitating Development in the World Trading 
System: A Proposal for Development Facilitation Tariff (DFT) and Development 
Facilitation Subsidy (DFS)” (2004) 38 Journal of World Trade, 935-954.
12
  Y.S. Lee, supra note 1, chapter 2.
4Section III discusses the possible elements of the ADF and the role of the Council.  Further, 
this section addresses the need for the Development Policy Review Mechanism (DPRM).  
Finally, Section IV provides a conclusion.
II. Current Development assistance Provisions and the Organizational Apparatus 
of the WTO13
A. Current Provisions
Major development-assistance provisions include GATT Articles XVIII, XXXVI –
XXXVIII, the “enabling clause,” and special and differential provisions (“S&D 
provisions”) in various WTO Agreements.
a. Article XVIII 
Article XVIII of the GATT, entitled “Government Assistance to Economic Development”14
facilitates the establishment of industries by authorizing relevant trade measures.  
Paragraph 2 provides, 
“The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary for those 
contracting parties (contracting parties the economies of which can only support 
low standards of living and are in the early stages of development), in order to 
implement programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise the 
general standard of living of their people, to take protective or other measures 
affecting imports, and that such measures are justified in so far as they facilitate the 
13
 Much of Section II is based on Y.S. Lee, “Reclaiming Development in the World 
Trading System”, supra note 1, chapter 2.
5attainment of the objectives of this Agreement.  They agree, therefore, that those 
contracting parties should enjoy additional facilities to enable them (a) to maintain 
sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to grant the tariff protection 
required for the establishment of a particular industry and (b) to apply 
quantitative restrictions for balance of payment purposes in a manner which takes 
full account of the continued high level of demand for imports likely to be generated 
by their programmes of economic development.” (Explanation and emphasis 
added.)
This Article supports the infant industry promotion policy.15 This policy uses tariff 
protections to promote domestic industries in the early stages of development.  GATT 
Article XVIII allows developing countries to establish a particular industry by authorizing 
them to maintain a flexible tariff structure (e.g., increase tariff rates by modifying the 
Schedule of Concessions). This flexibility enables developing countries to grant tariff 
protection for infant industries.  Article XVIII also acknowledges the need for trade 
measures for balance-of-payment (“BOP”) purposes.16
14
 WTO, The Legal Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The 
Legal Texts, supra note 3, at 447-453.
15
 Friedrich List (1789-1846) is widely known as the father of infant industry promotion, 
which was proposed in his famous work, The National System of Political Economy 
(1841).  
16
 Section B of Article XXVIII authorizes BOP measures for development purposes.  
Paragraph 8 of the article provides, “The contracting parties recognize that contracting 
parties coming within the scope of paragraph 4(a) of this article [i.e., developing countries 
in the early stages of development] tend, when they are in rapid process of development, to 
experience balance of payment difficulties arising mainly from efforts to expand their 
internal markets as well as from the instability in their terms of trade.” (Explanation 
added.) WTO, The Legal Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, supra note 3, at 449.  
6Reciprocity is required for a modification of the Schedule of Concessions to facilitate an 
industry; the modifying WTO Member (Member) is required to negotiate with other 
Members with which the relevant concession was initially negotiated having a substantial 
interest (paragraph 7(a) of Section A).  Therefore, this modification under Article XVIII 
may require a compensatory measure by the modifying Member to reach agreement with 
the other Members on the modification.   If an agreement is not reached within sixty days 
after the WTO is notified of the modification, the Member may still modify the concession 
in question unilaterally, on the condition that the WTO finds that the compensatory 
adjustment offered by the modifying Member is adequate and that every effort was made to 
reach an agreement.17  In addition, the modifying Member must give effect to the 
compensatory adjustment at the same time as the modification.18  However, if the WTO 
finds that the compensatory adjustment offer is not adequate, other Members with a 
substantial interest are free to adopt retaliatory measures by modifying or withdrawing 
substantially equivalent concessions against the modifying Member.19
Article XVIII relaxes the requirement of binding concessions under GATT Article II and 
authorizes developing country Members to modify its Schedule of Concessions to facilitate 
an industry.  However, the requirement of consultations and negotiations may cause 
considerable delays in implementing trade measures for development purposes. The 
requirement of reciprocal concessions (compensation) may also impose a burden on the 
economy of the modifying developing country.  While the effectiveness of infant industry 
17
 Art. XVIII, para. 7(b). Id., at 448.
18 Id.
19 Id.
7facilitation policies has been questioned in economic circles, the cases of recent 
development history indicate that the facilitation of industry by government has 
contributed to successful economic development.20  The case for infant industry promotion 
is further examined below in the discussion of adjustment to tariff bindings for 
development purposes.21  Thus, the provisions of Article XVIII can play a positive role in 
assisting economic development.  The requirements of negotiations and compensation may 
diminish the effectiveness of these provisions.
b. GATT Articles XXXVI - XXXVIII
Part IV of the GATT (Articles XXXVI – XXXVIII), entitled “Trade and Development,” 
provides another set of provisions attempting to assist economic development.  The 
provisions in GATT Articles XXXVI – XXXVIII set out an array of measures, 
commitments, and collaborations on the part of developed countries, as well as, the WTO 
in support of economic development. 
Article XXXVI22 addresses the vital role of export earnings in economic development; 
possible authorization of special measures to promote trade and development; the need for 
more favorable and acceptable conditions of access to world markets for primary products 
on which many developing countries depend; the need to diversify the economic structure 
on the part of developing countries and to avoid an excessive dependence on the export of 
20
 For more discussion on this point, see Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World 
Trading System, supra note 1, chapter 3.
21
 Section II.A.c infra.
22
 WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 
3, at 468-469.
8primary products; and an important relationship between trade and financial assistance to 
development.23  The Article also clarifies that there should be no expectation of reciprocity 
on the part of developed countries for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to 
reduce or remove tariffs and other trade barriers for developing Members.24
Article XXXVII25 elaborates developed country Members’ commitment to assist with 
economic development of developing countries.  Methods include: according high priority 
to the reduction and elimination of import barriers to products of particular export interest 
to developing Members; refraining from introducing or increasing import barriers to such 
products;26 and according high priority to the reduction and elimination of policies that are 
applicable specifically to primary products wholly or mainly produced in developing 
countries and that hamper the growth of consumption of those products.27  Developed 
country Members are also required to make efforts to maintain trade margins at equitable 
levels for developing countries where a government directly or indirectly determines the 
resale price of products wholly or mainly produced in developing country Members.28
They are also obligated to adopt measures providing a greater scope for the development of 
imports from those developing countries.29  Special regard is to be given to the trade 
23 Id.
24 Id., para. 8, at 469.
25 Id., at 469-471.
26 Id., at 469.  With respect to this commitment, Paragraph 1 of Article XXXVII provides 
in relevant part, “The developed contacting parties shall to the fullest extent possible – that 
is, except when compelling reasons, which may include legal reasons, make it impossible –
give effect to the following provisions.” Id. This provision allows developed countries to 
avoid this commitment by, for instance, legislating for import restraints from developing 
countries.  
27 Id., at 469-470.
28 Id.
29 Id.
9interests of developing countries in the application of trade measures against imports. 
(paragraph 3). Article XXXVIII30 provides for joint action to assist with the development 
of developing countries.  Article XXXVIII calls for an institutional effort by the WTO to 
provide assistance to development.  
It has been criticized that the provisions of Article XXXVI - XXXVIII are rather 
declaratory than obligatory in the sense that these provisions are not enforced by effective 
sanctions. Article XXXVII excuses developed country Members from the various 
commitments set out in the Article by invoking “compelling” reasons, thus further 
weakening the effectiveness of these provisions.31  These compelling reasons may include 
domestic legal obligations.  Developed countries, therefore, may escape from those so-
called “commitments” by legislating against them. It is thus doubtful that the commitments 
under Articles XXXVI – XXXVIII have actually affected the policies of developed 
countries in any significant way to accord more favorable treatment to developing 
countries.  
c. The Enabling Clause
A set of policy statements made in the GATT Decision on November 28, 1979 in favor of 
developing country members, referred to as “the enabling clause” also provides developing 
assistant provisions.32  This enabling clause approves the General System of Preferences 
30 Id, at 471-472.
31 Supra note 26.
32
 GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation on Developing Countries, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp. 1980), at 203. 
10
(GSP) and the exchange of preferences among developing country members.33  It also 
provides for differential and preferential treatment for developing countries with respect to 
non-tariff measures,34 as well as special treatment for LDCs.35  The enabling clause also 
states that developed countries should not expect reciprocity for the commitments made by 
them in trade concessions36 and that developed countries should exercise utmost restraint in 
seeking concessions from the LDCs.37 As in the case of Articles XXXVI – XXXVIII 
discussed above, the enabling clause is not mandatory in that there is no effective sanction 
against a violation of these commitments therein.  The enabling clause enables developed 
countries to provide preference for developing countries, but it does not obligate them to 
do so.
d. S&D Provisions
Other provisions in GATT/WTO disciplines, the majority of which are found in the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, provide special and differential treatment in favor of 
developing countries.38  These provisions relax current discipline requirements for the 
benefit of developing countries, require protection of the interests of developing countries, 
or give more compliance time for developing countries (transitional period).  However, this 
33 Id., para. 2a.
34 Id., para. 2d.
35 Id., para. 2b.
36 Id., para. 5.
37 Id., para. 6.
38
 One hundred and forty-five such provisions are scattered throughout several WTO 
agreements, understandings, and GATT articles.  Twenty-two are applied exclusively to 
LDCs.  For a review of the special and differential treatment provisions in the WTO, see 
WTO, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO 
Agreements and Decisions – Note by Secretariat, WTO doc. WT/COMTD/W/77 (October 
25, 2000). 
11
S&D treatment, as currently provided, is not sufficient to meet the development needs of 
developing countries on the following grounds.
First, protection is often not sufficient.  For instance, Article 9.1 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards requires the exemption of imports originating in a developing country Member 
from safeguards where the portion of such imports does not exceed 3 percent, provided that 
the collective share of imports from all such developing country Members (under 3 
percent) accounts for not more than 9 percent.39  Article 9.2 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards also allows developing country Members to apply safeguards for an additional 
two years beyond the maximum duration and to re-apply safeguards to the same product 
after shortened intervals. 40 It has been criticized that the ceilings (individual 3 percent and 
collective 9 percent) are too tight, and the small extensions are not very helpful for 
developing countries.41  Similarly, these provisions do not relieve developing countries of 
the requirements of WTO disciplines in any significant way or give substantial protections 
in the areas where their trade interests are significantly affected, such as tariff bindings, 
subsidy, and anti-dumping rules.42
The transition period provided as a preference for developing countries is not very helpful, 
either; the S&D treatment will expire after a stipulated period for transition while the need 
39
 WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 
3, at 279-280
40 Id.
41
 Jai S. Mah, “Injury and Causation in the Agreement on Safeguards” (2001) 4 Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 380–382.
42
 Thus, the author proposed regulatory reforms in these areas.  Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming 
Development in the World Trading System, supra note 1.
12
of development that may justify the S&D treatment may remain.  Where permanent 
exceptions are given, the number of beneficiary developing countries is often too limited: 
e.g., where exemptions are allowed in subsidy rules to permit export subsidies, only a 
handful of LDCs benefit from this exemption on a permanent basis.43  In addition, current 
S&D treatment does not provide differentiated treatment to developing countries of widely 
different development status, other than LDCs.  A recent study pointed out the need for 
greater differentiation in S&D treatment.44
B. Current Organizational Apparatus in the WTO
The major organizational body that concerns trade and development within the WTO is the 
“Committee on Trade and Development” (CTD).  The CTD is established under the 
General Council with a mandate to handle issues on trade and development and address 
related issues such as implementation of preferential provisions for developing countries, 
guidelines for technical cooperation, increased participation of developing countries in the 
trading system, LDCs, notifications of GSP programs, and preferential trade arrangements 
among developing countries. 
Current WTO assistance to developing countries focuses on the capacity-building of 
developing countries.  In this area, the WTO offers assistance through its Training and 
Technical Cooperation Institute.  Assistance includes providing regular training sessions 
43
 For instance, only LDCs are exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies. See 
Section III.A.d infra for a relevant discussion.
44
 Michael Hart and Bill Dymond, “Special and Differential Treatment and the Doha 
‘Development’ Round” (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 409.
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about trade policy in Geneva, organizing around 400 technical cooperation activities 
annually, including seminars and workshops in various countries and courses in Geneva, 
and offering legal assistance to some developing countries.45  These capacity-building 
activities are undoubtedly helpful to developing countries, but the scope of assistance is 
rather limited as it is focuses on technical capacity-building.  The WTO also needs to 
consider other essential areas concerning trade and development, such as technology 
transfer, financial mechanism, and debt relief.
The CTD does not have a mandate to address these other essential issues; thus, developing 
countries have requested discussion of these issues in the WTO.  The need for a new round 
to address a development agenda has been widely resonated.  The 2004 Report on the 
implementation of the U.N. Millennium Declaration emphasized the responsibility of 
developed countries to meet development goals, stating specifically that developed 
countries must fulfill their responsibilities “by increasing and improving development-
assistance, concluding a new development-oriented trade round, embracing wider and 
deeper debt relief, and fostering technology transfer.”46  In response to this demand, the 
new round includes a series of development issues in its agenda (DDA).  In addition, the 
DDA established two working groups, “Trade, Debt and Finance” and “Trade and 
45
 For legal assistance, thirty-two WTO governments created an Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law in 2001.  Its members consist of countries contributing funding, and those receiving 
legal advice.  LDCs are automatically eligible for advice, while other developing countries 
and transition economies have to be fee-paying members.  For further information, refer to 
the WTO website at <www.wto.org>.  In addition, The WTO Reference Centre program 
was also initiated in 1997 with the objective of creating a network of computerized 
information centers in LDC and developing countries.  The International Trade Centre, a 
joint body with UNCTAD, also helps developing countries to expand export and to 
improve their import operations.
46
 U.N. doc. A/59/282 (August 27, 2004), para. 43
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Technology Transfer.”47  Negotiations on these issues are currently on the way, and the 
CTD meets in special sessions to handle work under the DDA.
C. Case for the Council for Trade and Development and the Agreement on 
Development Facilitatio
The current problem with WTO provisions and the organization structure concerning trade 
and development is that these provisions are not very effective, as discussed above, and 
that the current organizational apparatus48 is rather insufficient to address complex and 
long-term development issues on trade and development effectively.  The mandate of the 
CTD is limited and the activities of the WTO to assist developing countries also have been 
rather limited in scope, as discussed above.  The problem of ineffectiveness and 
insufficiency can be answered by elevating the existing Committee to full Council status 
thus strengthening the organizational apparatus and by establishing a separate agreement 
on development (ADF).
With respect to the suggested organizational reform, the need for such an elevation can be 
explained by comparison with the treatment of trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) promoted by developed countries.  While trade and development issues 
concern the vast majority of WTO members, relatively a limited number of countries 
promoted intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  Nonetheless, the 
47
 The DDA address the issues of trade, debt and finance; trade and transfer of technology; 
technical cooperation and capacity building; LDCs; and special and differential treatment.  
WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (November 20, 2001).   
48 The current organizational apparatus consists of the CTD and the Subcommittee on 
LDCs aided by the Training and Technical Cooperation Institute under the WTO 
Secretariat.
15
importance of intellectual property rights was emphasized during the negotiations, and the 
full Council, not a Committee, and a separate Agreement (“the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” or “TRIPS Agreement”) were established 
in the WTO to address complex and long-term intellectual property issues.49
As mentioned, the issues of trade and development concern a vast number of developing 
countries, and there is a consensus in the WTO that these issues should be addressed within 
the WTO.  The current DDA reflects this consensus, and the current round is called “the 
development round”. If these trade and development issues, which concern the majority of 
WTO membership, are considered as important as TRIPS, which was promoted by a fewer 
number of developed countries, it is fair and proper that trade and development issues be 
accorded the same institutional attention and weight by elevating the present Committee to 
full Council status.  This proposed institutional reform would help resolve doubt that trade 
and development issues have not received due attention and have been set aside.50  This 
elevation will not only make a statement recognizing the essential importance of 
development issues, but also meet practical needs.
The practical needs include that present working groups would have to be replaced with 
separate committees.  WTO working groups are currently established to address important 
trade and development issues such as trade, debt and finance, and trade and technology 
49
 The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is organized 
under Article IV of the WTO Agreement. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 5.
50 Per India, WTO, Report of the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development
(1999), available online at <www.wto.org>.
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transfer.  These issues are complex and require continued attention within the WTO even 
after the current round, and separate committees, rather than limited sub-committees, will 
be necessary to incorporate these important issues as a working agenda in the WTO.  To 
oversee the effective operation of these committees, a separate council would need to be 
established within the WTO.  In addition, as individual developing countries face unique 
problems with increasing their participation in the WTO and securing full benefits of WTO 
membership, an additional committee is also necessary to bring adequate institutional 
attention to these problems and assist with their needs more effectively on an individual 
country basis.  The current Advisory Centre on WTO Law51 may be expanded and 
incorporated into this body to render legal advice to developing country Members.
In summary, the lack of due organizational status and the resulting appearance of 
insufficient institutional attention to development issues have created a widespread 
perception that the WTO represents the interests of developed countries and multinational 
corporations rather than those of its majority Members – developing countries.  A way to 
resolve this issue is to elevate the current body in charge of development issues to council 
level.  Instituting a new Council could also serve important functionalities that the current 
CTD is not mandated to serve.  Such functionality could include a better organizational 
apparatus to deal with specific, but complex and long-term issues of development.  A new 
Council will have a wider mandate concerning trade and development issues to implement 
necessary measures to promote development, and will bring a capacity to address essential 
development issues that concern the majority of WTO Members. 
51 Supra note 45.
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As discussed above, with respect to the current WTO provisions assisting development, the 
ineffectiveness of these provisions is an issue.  For instance, relevant GATT provisions 
such as Articles XVIII and XXXVI - XXXVIII have become obsolete and ineffective.  Yet, 
unlike other areas, the Uruguay Round did not elaborate on these GATT articles and did 
not set out more effective and enforceable agreements.  Provisions offering S&D treatment 
are scattered throughout the GATT/WTO disciplines without any coherent regulatory 
standard, and developed countries have shown reluctance in extending these provisions.  
Consideration should be given to establishing a coherent set of rules in the form of a 
separate agreement in the WTO disciplines to address trade and development issues more 
effectively and consistently.     
What regulatory elements should be included in the ADF?  The ADF may develop specific 
legal obligations, as well as monitoring and surveillance of their implementations, to 
increase the enforceability of developed countries’ commitments under Part IV of the 
GATT, just as other Uruguay Round agreements expand and elaborate the provisions of the 
GATT, and turn them into more specific, enforceable obligations.  The ADF may also 
provide coherent and differentiated standards to apply S&D treatment to developing 
country Members.  In addition, the author examined the inconsistency of current WTO 
disciplines in relation to the development interests of developing countries, and proposed 
reforms of the regulatory disciplines in the areas relevant to development, such as tariff 
bindings, subsidies, anti-dumping measures, safeguards, agriculture, trade-related 
18
investment measures (TRIMs), TRIPS, and service trade (GATS).52  Some of these 
proposed reforms can also be incorporated in the ADF, as discussed in the following 
section.  However, these elements do not comprise an exhaustive list.  The scope and 
contents of the ADF need to be further discussed, taking into account progress made in the 
current discussion of the DDA. 
If the suggested elements discussed in the following section are to be included in the ADF, 
the ADF may require separate status within Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement as the 
provisions of the ADF would affect the TRIPS Agreement, as well as the Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods.  In addition to the functionalities facilitating development, 
the ADF, by providing a coherent and permanent regulatory structure on trade 
development, unlike temporary and limited S&D treatment, would also make a statement 
that development issues are considered as essential as other issues promoted by developed 
countries, and thus, development issues are no longer only a subject of elaborate rhetoric. 
III. The Elements of the ADF and the Role of the New Council.
A. Possible Elements of the ADF53
a. Setting procedures to monitor and enforce commitments under Part IV of the 
GATT 1994.
52
 Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, supra note 1.  See 
also Y.S. Lee, “Facilitating Development in World Trading System: Proposal for 
Development Facilitation Tariff (DFT) and Development Facilitation Subsidy (DFS)”, 
Journal of World Trade, Vol. 38, No. 6 (2004), at 935-954.
53
 The contents of Section III.A.c~f incorporate regulatory reforms proposed by the author 
in his forthcoming book, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, supra
note 1. 
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GATT Articles XXXVI–XXXVIII are major GATT provisions that attempt to assist with 
the economic development of developing countries.  However, as discussed earlier, these 
provisions are largely declaratory and do not create enforceable obligations.  The 
ineffectiveness of these provisions is in part because there is no effective monitoring and 
enforcement system.  Thus, setting procedures to monitor and enforce specific 
commitments by developed country Members may increase the effectiveness of these 
provisions.  One way is to obligate developed country Members and participating 
developing country Members to report their specific commitments under these provisions 
periodically and consult with the WTO on the implementation of these commitments.  The 
Council for Trade and Development, proposed above, can oversee this procedure.
This report, provisionally named “Trade-Related Development Assistance Report” or 
“TDAR”, may itemize the commitments listed under Article XXXVII54 and require every 
developed country Member to list their specific economic and trade measures that would 
implement commitments under each item.  Developed country Members should also be 
required to list any laws, practices, and policies that are inconsistent with these 
commitments and to consult with the Council to resolve the problem.  A timetable can be 
agreed between the developed country Member and the Council setting for their removal or 
change. The broad exemption that currently excuses developed country Members from 
commitments under Article XXXVII for any compelling reason, including legal reasons,55
54 See Section II.A.b supra for a discussion of these commitments.
55 Supra note 26.
20
should be removed as it allows Members to disregard these commitments simply by 
legislating against them.   
Developed country Members should also be required to report the implementation of 
relevant measures under the itemized commitments and any undertaking to remove or 
change inconsistent policies, laws, and practices to the Council on a regular basis.  The 
Council should review these reports, consult with the Members for any violation of their 
commitments, and adopt measures, if necessary, to ensure their compliance.  Any 
interested Member should be allowed to report a violation of these commitments to the 
Council.  The Council should then examine the incidence and determine whether there has 
been a violation.  If it determines a violation occurred, the Council may also adopt 
necessary measures to secure compliance, including authorization of trade sanctions.  This 
combination of monitoring, consultation, and enforcement measures, as well as setting 
their procedures in the ADF should increase the regulatory force of Article XXXVII.   
Lastly, the ADF may also establish procedures to set out specific joint actions to be 
undertaken by the WTO under Article XXXVIII and report implementation of these 
actions on a regular basis.  The Council and other institutions with which the WTO has 
collaborated under this Article may prepare these reports jointly.  
b. S&D provisions
Provisions offering S&D treatment to developing countries are scattered throughout 
various WTO disciplines without any coherent regulatory standards – i.e., what is the 
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underlying principle providing S&D treatment and how do we determine developing 
country Members to benefit from this preferential treatment?  Under the current system, the 
developing country status is self-declaratory, and the absence of definition for developing 
country Members seems to create regulatory ambiguity.  In addition, the current system 
provides the same level of S&D treatment to developing country Members with widely 
different levels of development status and economic need for S&D treatment.  A recent 
study emphasizes the need for greater differentiation in S&D treatment.56  The ADF should 
provide a definition for a developing country Member and also differentiate S&D treatment 
to developing country Members to enhance the clarity and rationality of the system.
What standard can be adopted to determine the developing country status?  Individual 
income level can be considered.  The World Bank uses gross national income (GNI) per 
capita to categorize nations into different income groups.57  This economic indicator can be 
use as a primary determinant for the development status.58  Methods for differentiating 
S&D treatment for different developing country Members should also be sought, and the 
sub-categorization of the developed country Members such as the one used by the World 
56 Supra note 44.
57
 As of November 2004, the World Bank made this classification according to its 2003 
statistics: low-income group ($765 or less per capita), lower-middle-income group 
(between $766 and $3,035 per capita), upper-middle-income group (between $3,036 and 
$9,385), and high-income group ($9,386 or above). Information available online at 
<www.worldbank.org>.
58
 The above threshold for the high-income group can be used to create a presumption of 
the developed country status. If a Member claims the developing country status despite its 
per capita GNI level above this threshold, due to other factors that indicate a low level of 
social development or an excessive economic dependency on the production of primary 
products (e.g., oil), the Member should be allowed to counter the presumption of the 
developed country status.
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Bank can be adopted for such differentiation.  For instance, Article 9.2 of the Safeguards 
Agreement authorizes a longer duration of a safeguard measure to be applied by a 
developing country Member,59 and this additional duration can be differentiated in 
accordance with the developed status of the particular developing country Member 
(perhaps extended for poorer developing countries and shortened for richer ones) identified 
by the sub-categorization discussed earlier.
Achieving regulatory coherency for S&D treatment also requires establishing coherent 
principles for providing this treatment.  It is not clear if such coherent principles exist 
because provisions offering S&D treatment arose out of political compromises between 
developed and developing country Members.  Developed country Members were rather 
reluctant to provide extensive S&D treatment while developing country Members insisted 
on such treatment. Some S&D treatment simply buys developed country Members more 
time to comply with WTO obligations while others provide permanent preferential 
treatment.60  The tendency trying to limit preferential treatment to developing country 
Members seem to continue as reflected in a statement made by a prominent speaker in the 
1999 WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development that advised developing 
countries to avoid a push for renewed S&D treatment.61
The reluctance on the part of developed country Members to provide extensive S&D 
59
 WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 
3, at 280.
60 Supra note 38.
61
 C. Fred Bergsten. WTO, Report of the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and 
Development (1999), supra note 50.
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treatment may represent their preference for “one rule for all nations.”  In other words, 
eventually one rule should apply to all trading nations, both developed and developing, and 
S&D treatment that offers temporary preference should not be extended in time.  In 
addition, S&D treatment that offers a permanent preference to a limited number of 
developing country Members, such as LDCs, should not be expanded to benefit more 
developing country Members.  It would be necessary to reconsider whether this one-rule 
policy is justifiable.  If the development needs of developing country Members justify 
preferential treatment in the first place, then this treatment should not expire until they 
attain developed status, and therefore, this one-rule policy is not tenable from the 
perspective of economic development.62  The proposed regulatory reforms suggest that 
preferential treatment be extended to all developing country Members in many areas of 
trade, as discussed below.
c. Adjustment to Tariff Bindings63
The GATT/WTO system requires Members to maintain their commitments on import 
concessions in the form of tariff bindings stipulated in the Schedule of Concessions.64
While this principle provides essential stability to the international trading system, the tariff 
commitments remove the ability of developing countries to use trade protection to facilitate 
their industries at early stages of development (“infant industries”).  There is considerable 
62 See also Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, supra note 1.
63
 The proposal to adjust binding concessions to facilitate development was first made in 
the author’s previous article, “Facilitating Development in World Trading System: 
Proposal for Development Facilitation Tariff (DFT) and Development Facilitation 
Subsidy (DFS)”, supra note 52.
64
 Article I of the GATT, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, supra note 3, at 425-427.
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debate on the validity of infant industry promotion policies.  Nonetheless, a recent study 
recognizes that fundamental economic restructuring seldom takes place in the absence of 
governmental intervention,65 and the case for state supported industrial facilitation has 
already been made in some literature.66  Regardless of the debate, a developing country 
should be allowed to choose policies that are best suited for their own development, fully 
considering the ramifications of the proposed tariff increases.  If it finally determines that 
its industrial promotion policy demands tariff increases, its previous import commitments 
should not tie its hands. The provisions of GATT Article XVIII allow modification of the 
schedule to aid the facilitation of infant industries, but these provisions require Members to 
undergo potentially time-consuming and complicated negotiations with other interested 
Members prior to the application of higher tariffs.
Thus, more flexible treatment should be available to developing countries with respect to 
binding concessions authorizing additional tariffs beyond their scheduled commitments to 
facilitate industries for economic development.67  This additional tariff applied for the 
purpose of infant industry promotion can be called “Development-Facilitation Tariff” or 
65
 Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century (paper prepared for UNIDO, 
September 2004), at 15
66 Y.S. Lee, “Facilitating Development in World Trading System: Proposal for 
Development Facilitation Tariff (DFT) and Development Facilitation Subsidy (DFS)”,
supra note 52, at 938-939.
67 Arguably, the need for tariff protection should have been contemplated by developing 
countries when they agreed to specific tariff bindings in the multilateral trade negotiations.  
Nonetheless, their economic needs and national goals may have changed following 
political shifts (e.g., election of a new government, end of a dictatorship, etc), and 
therefore, development initiatives may begin long after the conclusion of trade 
negotiations.  If so, the developing country should not be prohibited from offering trade 
protection to its infant industry because of its previous import commitments, and it should 
be allowed to do so without prolonging negotiations and the burden of compensations or 
threat of retaliations.  
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“DFT.”  68  In brief, the DFT allows a developing country to apply tariff rates above the 
scheduled commitments unilaterally when the country can demonstrate a development 
need for such a tariff with a concrete plan for industrial facilitation.  The application of a 
DFT should require procedural safeguards to minimize the possibility of abuse.  Safeguards 
could include a formal investigation and hearing requirement, notices to other interested 
Members, consultations, and a maximum duration for its application.  The maximum 
applicable rate of the DFT should also be systematically differentiated according to the 
development stage of a particular developing country, as determined by the level of its per-
capita income (i.e., the maximum DFT rate applicable by wealthier developing countries 
should be lower than that of a less affluent developing country, measured by per-capita 
income).69
Some may argue that the introduction of DFTs in the world trading system will undermine 
the import concessions made by developing countries and disrupt the balance of 
concessions achieved through the trade negotiations.  While those concessions are 
important, the need for economic development should be given priority.  The impact of 
DFTs on world trade will be rather limited since over two-thirds of world trade is 
conducted among developed economies, which would not be subject to DFT applications.70
68 The author refers the reader to the details of the proposed DFT to the author’s previous 
article, Y.S. Lee, “Facilitating Development in World Trading System: Proposal for 
Development Facilitation Tariff (DFT) and Development Facilitation Subsidy (DFS)”,
supra note 52.
69 There will likely be some concern that this liberal treatment may lead to rampant 
protectionism by developing countries without either a genuine need or a constructive plan 
for infant industry promotion. The procedural safeguards introduced above counter this 
possibility of abuse. 
70
 WTO, International Trade Statistics 2004, Table 1.6 Leading exporters and importers in 
merchandise trade (excluding intra-EU trade), available online at <http://www.wto.org >.
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In addition, due to demands by developed countries with more powerful economies, 
developing countries with limited negotiating power are often compelled to make 
concessions beyond the levels that they are ready to offer.71  Consequently, where there are 
clear development plans that demand import protection, it would be fair to allow import 
restraints to meet development needs.
d. Subsidy Treatment
Another essential element of industrial promotion policies for economic development is a 
government subsidy.  Strategically planned government subsidization has contributed to the 
successful development of some developing countries, such as South Korea.  Under the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), export 
subsidies (subsidies that are provided contingent on export performance) and import-
substitution subsidies (subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic over imported 
goods) are prohibited as they have adverse effects on international trade.72  In addition, a 
subsidy is “actionable” (i.e., the other country may retaliate against this subsidy with 
counter measures) when certain conditions are met.73 Countervailing duties (CVDs), which 
71
 For developing countries and trade negotiations, see Anne Krueger, “The Developing 
Countries and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” (1999) 22(9) World 
Economy 909-932.
72 The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 
233. Annex I of the SCM Agreement includes the illustrative list of prohibited export 
subsidies. Id., at 265-267.
73
 These conditions are: i) the subsidy is specifically limited to an enterprise or group of 
enterprises, an industrial sector or group of industries, or a designed geographic region 
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority (specificity requirement) and ii) the subsidy 
causes adverse effects to the interests of other Members.  Adverse effects include a) injury 
(material injury) to the domestic industry of the importing country, b) nullification or 
impairment of benefits of bound tariff rates, or c) serious prejudice to the domestic 
industry.  The SCM Agreement, arts 2 and 5.  Id., at 232, 235,
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are additional tariffs imposed on imports to offset the effect of subsidies,74 are also 
applicable as a remedy where subsidization causes or threatens material injury to an 
established domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry.75
Current WTO subsidy provisions prohibiting export subsidies and import-substitution 
subsidies, as well as those authorizing countervailing measures against actionable 
subsidies,76 reduce the key ability of developing countries to provide support to promote 
their industries in the early stages of development.77  Infant industries in developing 
economies often need export markets due to their limited domestic market.  Government 
support is called upon to improve their competitiveness in the foreign market, as well as, in 
their own.  The SCM Agreement recognizes this and affirms, “subsidies may play an 
important role in economic development programmes of developing country Members.”78
The SCM Agreement also provides certain special and differential treatment to developing 
74
 Part V of the SCM Agreement (Articles 10-23) provides for substantive and procedural 
rules for the application of countervailing duties. Id., 243-258.  Exporters can also avoid 
countervailing duties by undertaking to increase their export prices (price undertaking).  
This price undertaking is voluntary on the part of the exporters, and the importing country 
may consider the acceptance of the undertaking impractical, for instance, where the 
number of actual or potential exporters is too great.  The SCM Agreement, art. 18. Id., at 
253-254. 
75
 GATT art. VI, para. 6. Id., at 431-432.
76 Supra notes 72, 73.
77
 It has been observed that the current subsidy rules have made “a significant dent in the 
abilities of developing countries to employ intelligently-designed industrial policies.
Rodrik (2004), supra note 65, at 34-35.  Note that today’s developed countries provided 
extensive subsidies during their development stages, which would have been either 
prohibited or actionable under the SCM. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: 
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem Press, 2002), chapter 2.
78
 The SCA Agreement, art. 27.1. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 261.
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countries: i.e., LDC Members are not prohibited from applying export subsidies,79 and 
other developing countries are permitted to apply export subsidies for a period of eight 
years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, which has already 
expired.80  These prohibited or otherwise actionable subsidies should be allowed for 
developing countries if they demonstrate a need for such subsidies with a concrete 
development plan.  This subsidy that is specially authorized to facilitate development, can 
be labeled “Development-Facilitation Subsidy” or “DFS.”  
As in the case of the DFT, procedural safeguards should be provided to minimize the abuse 
of DFS applications.  The maximum applicable DFS rate should also be differentiated in 
accordance with the per-capita income level of a particular developing country, as the 
development need would be greater for poorer developing countries.  A question may arise 
as to whether the availability of a DFS would lead to a subsidy race among developing 
countries, thus diminishing the effect of the subsidy for the industrial promotion of 
individual developing countries but causing only a distortion of resources.  The answer is 
that a developing country should be trusted with its own best judgment as to whether 
subsidization would be necessary.  Many economic and political factors would affect a 
government decision to grant a subsidy, and a prudent government will consider the 
existence and even the possibility of similar subsidies which may be applied by competing 
countries in future.  A developing country will subsidize export industries it believes have 
79
 The SCA Agreement, art. 27.2(a).  Id., at 261. This preference ceases to apply to any of 
these LDC Members when it reaches USD 1,000 GNP per capita. Annex VII. Id., at 274.
80
 The SCA Agreement, art. 27.2(a).  Id., at 261.  The WTO Agreement was entered into 
force as of 1995.
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the best potential of success, and the possibility of these competing subsidies will be part of 
that equation.
e. The Suspension of Anti-Dumping Measures, TRIMs Agreement and TRIPS 
Agreement 
Elements of the ADF may also include suspension of anti-dumping (AD) measures, the 
TRIMS Agreement, and the TRIPS Agreement, in favor of developing countries.81  AD 
actions82 that are applied against “dumped imports” in the form of increased tariffs, are the 
most frequently applied import measures in the world today.  As of June 2003, there were 
as many as 1,323 AD actions reported to be in force.83  Exports from developing countries 
have been the primary target of AD actions.  Between July 2002 and June 2003, over half 
of the 238 AD investigations targeted imports from developing countries.84  Considering 
that total exports from developing countries are less than half the exports from developed 
countries,85 a substantially higher rate of exports from developing countries has been 
targeted for AD actions. 
81
 An argument may be made that these elements can be included in the corresponding 
agreements and not in the ADF.  Their regulatory placement requires further discussion. In 
this paper, these elements are introduced to discuss their substantive merits. 
82 The WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“Anti-dumping Practices Agreement” or “ADP Agreement”) For 
the specific determination of dumping margins and the imposition and collection of anti-
dumping duties, see The ADP Agreement, arts 6.10 and art. 9. WTO, The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Legal Texts, supra note 3, at 157-
158, 160-162. Price undertakings are also allowed as in the application of CVD actions. 
Supra note 74. The ADP Agreement, art. 8. Id., at 159-160.  For the origin of anti-dumping 
measures, see Congressional Budget Office, How the GATT Affects Antidumping and 
Countervailing-duty Policy (1994) at 18. Anti-dumping actions include both anti-dumping 
duties and price undertakings.  
83
 WTO, Annual Report (WTO: Geneva, 2004), at 46.
84 Id.
85
 WTO, International Trade Statistics 2004, available on line at <www.wto.org>.
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Most economists doubt that solid economic justifications exist for anti-dumping measures.  
Also, inherent complexity and arbitrariness in the determination of dumping86 have been a 
breeding ground for abuse of AD actions.87  National authorities can adopt a methodology 
that will yield the least desirable result for exporters88 and then come up with a finding of 
dumping.89  Depending upon their choice of methodology and calculation, the authorities 
will also be able to find different dumping margins.90  This arbitrariness in the current AD 
rules and its significant adverse effect on trade have led to the inclusion of AD rules in the
86
 A dumping is defined as the sale at a price under “normal value” that needs to be first 
determined. The ADP Agreement, art 2.1. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 147. The complexity and arbitrariness in 
the determination of normal value are easily seen: e.g., there may not be a single home 
market price to compare, and the complex adjusted average may have to be calculated to 
come up with a reference home price; the home country may not completely be a market 
economy (e.g., “transitional economy”), and therefore, the home price may not represent 
the true market price; or the product in question may not even be sold in the home market 
or too few of it is sold to be the basis of a valid home price.  In all these cases, the price 
needs to be “constructed” by an evaluation of cost (constructed cost) plus reasonable profit.  
Finding the “export price” that is necessary to determine the existence of dumping by 
comparison with the home price can be equally complex since a number of adjustments to 
the transaction price may be necessary to keep the comparison with the home price fair.  
These adjustments may include complex calculations involving numerous items such as 
warranty services, advertising costs, etc.  Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World 
Trading System, supra note 1, chapter 4.
87 Depending upon a specific methodology adopted to calculate costs and average prices, 
the result can be vastly different, not to mention that the measure of “reasonable profit” can 
also vary. A recent study has revealed that in the case of the United States, the vast 
majority of national AD practices do not even actually identify either price discrimination 
or sales below cost.  Brink Lindsey, “The U.S. Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus 
Reality,” Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 7 (August 16, 1999).
88
 Article 2 of the ADP Agreement authorizes such leeway in the determination of 
dumping. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation, 
supra note 3, at 147-150.
89
 Although the provisions of the ADP Agreement attempt to provide disciplines on AD 
actions, “in common parlance, it is usual to designate all low-cost imports as dumped 
imports.” International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO and Commonwealth Secretariat, 
Business Guide to the Uruguay Round (ITC/CS: Geneva, 1995), at 181.
90 Supra note 88.
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new Doha Round agenda, with a possibility of rule modifications.91  Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely that the inherent arbitrariness in determining dumping could be reduced to a 
satisfactory level.92
AD measures cause a critical problem to the trade of developing countries.  The 
competitiveness of their product is normally based on low prices, reflecting lower labor 
costs.  Developing countries should be allowed to exploit this advantage to achieve 
economic development through international trade.  AD measures that are targeting 
inexpensive products have been major impediments to the exports of developing 
countries.93  Although a lower price alone is not a sufficient ground for the application of 
AD measures,94 the current provisions permitting the “construction” of costs and reference 
prices make it relatively easy for the national authorities to find dumping and apply AD 
measures against exports from developing countries.  Yale economist T. N. Srinivasan has 
characterized anti-dumping as the equivalent of a “nuclear weapon in the armory of trade 
91
 WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (November 20, 2001), para. 28. 
Reform proposals have been made to reduce the abuse and arbitrariness in the application 
of AD measures. See Brink Lindsey and Dan Ikenson, “Reforming the Antidumping 
Agreement: A Road Map for WTO Negotiations”, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 
21 (December 11, 2002).
92
 It is because the very attempt to determine the “normalcy” of a price in a market 
economy in which prices are determined by market forces and not by any normative rules, 
is inherently arbitrary no matter what standard is applied.  It was pointed out that “[t]he 
primary justification for the antidumping law is really more political than economic.  The 
guiding precept is legitimacy rather than efficiency.” Brink Lindsey, “The U.S. 
Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality,” supra note 87, at 3.
93 Supra note 89.
94
 Dumping should also cause or threaten material injury to the domestic industry for the 
application of an AD measure. GATT Article VI, para. 6, WTO, The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 431-432.  Unlike the 
serious injury standard required for the application of a safeguard measure (Agreement on 
Safeguards, art. 2. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, supra note 3, at 276-277), the threshold for material injury is not considered 
high.
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policy” and suggested removing it in the 1999 WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and 
Development.95 Indeed, considering the economic needs of developing countries, AD 
measures should not be applicable to their trade.  Safeguard measures, emergency trade 
restriction measures applicable to increases in imports that cause or threaten to cause 
serious injury to a domestic industry,96 can respond to the predatory dumping that results in 
the displacement of domestic products, which may be the only justification for anti-
dumping rules, despite its limited likelihood of success.97
Another area that has significant relevance to the economic development and trade of 
developing countries is foreign investment.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) may provide 
developing countries with resources necessary for the development that these countries 
typically lack, including financial capital, technological resources, production facilities, 
and managerial expertise.  FDI also offers employment opportunities for local populations.  
In accepting FDI, the host developing countries may be inclined to set a series of 
conditions to steer FDI to maximize its contribution to their development objectives.  For 
example, in order to facilitate export industries, these governments may adopt investment 
measures that require foreign investors to export a certain portion of products that are 
produced in the host country.  
95
 World Trade Organization, Report on the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and 
Development (1999), supra note 95.
96
 Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards sets out the general requirement for the 
application of a safeguard measure. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 275.  
97
 For more discussion, see Y.S. Lee, Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal 
Analysis (Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed. 2005), chapter 14.2.
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Investment measures may have significant implications on trade. For instance, if the host 
country adopts investment measures requiring foreign investment to export a certain 
portion of their products in an attempt to promote exports and reduce competition with 
other domestic producers, this foreign company may be compelled to export more than it 
would otherwise have.  Similarly, if investment measures that require foreign investments 
to purchase domestic products may reduce the importation of these products from other 
countries that it may have in the absence of such measures. The WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures98 attempts to regulate certain investment measures that affect 
trade, namely, those that are inconsistent with Articles III and XI of the GATT.99
As mentioned, trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) are often adopted in pursuing 
development objectives.  Although there was some doubt as to the industrial promotion 
effects of TRIMs,100 TRIMs may nevertheless play an important role in industrial 
promotion since they can help facilitate infant domestic industries by promoting exports 
and encouraging the use of domestic products.  Note that all of today’s developed countries 
also adopted investment measures to meet their development objectives during their own 
98
 WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 
3, at 143-146. 
99
 GATT arts III and XI. WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, supra note 3, at 427-249, 437, respectively.
100 The criticism includes: TRIMs are economically inefficient since investment terms are 
controlled by investment measures rather than by market forces; the governments of the 
hosting countries may abuse TRIMs politically, for instance, to serve the interests of select 
producers that are not necessarily relevant to the needs for development; and the restrictive 
terms of TRIMs may also discourage investors from making investments in developing 
countries adopting these measures and thereby deprive the host developing countries of the 
opportunities to benefit from the investment that can provide necessary resources for their 
development.  This criticism about TRIMs is in line with the objections to state industrial 
promotion discussed earlier.  See also Y.S. Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World 
Trading System, supra note 1, chapter 3.1. 
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development.101 The TRIMs Agreement seems to target mostly the investment regulations 
of developing countries. There seems no clear need for such multilateral control on 
investment.  For instance, major investors are often in a position to negotiate with the host 
developing country about the terms of their investment.  In addition, over 1,100 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) around the world1 already require national treatment in favor of 
foreign investors and prohibit a wider range of TRIMs than those restrained by the TRIMs 
Agreement.  If a developing country is ready to give up certain TRIMs, it will do so 
bilaterally or unilaterally, even without any treaty obligations.  However, if a developing 
country considers the adoption of TRIMS as necessary to meet their development 
objectives, then mandatory trade rules should not prohibit their adoptions.  Therefore, the 
multilateral control on TRIMs needs to be lifted in favor of developing countries. 102
Lastly, the application of the TRIPS Agreement to developing countries should be 
reconsidered.  Advanced knowledge, such as new technology and production techniques, is 
essential to facilitating industries.  Historically, the ability to copy technologies developed 
in advanced countries has been one of the most essential elements in determining the 
101
 Ha-Joon Chang and Duncan Green, The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do As 
We Say, Not As We Did, South Centre/CAFOD, June 2003, at 33. TRIMs can be either 
effective or counter-effective to the development interest of a particular developing country 
depending upon the economic conditions and the development stage which the individual 
developing country is in.  For instance, an imposition of a local content requirement may 
be unnecessary and economically inefficient at a time when the domestic industry can 
compete with imports.  On the other hand, this particular investment measure may be 
useful and facilitate domestic infant industries in the initial stages of development where 
domestic industries require some protection.  This suggests that TRIMs can be a means to 
facilitate development.
102
 Reflecting this concern, twelve countries proposed to change the text of the TRIMs 
Agreement to make commitments under the Agreement optional and not mandatory. WTO 
doc. WT/GC/W/354 (dated October 11, 1999).
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ability of developing countries to catch up.103  Developed countries today attempt to 
prevent unauthorized use of advanced technology by assigning a propriety right called 
intellectual property right (IPR).  Thus, the enforcement of IPRs affects the ability of 
developing countries to acquire advanced technology for the purpose of development.  The 
introduction of the TRIPS Agreement in trade disciplines is one of the important attempts 
to enforce IPRs around the world. 
The introduction of the TRIPS Agreement was an ambitious undertaking in the Uruguay 
Round.104  This Agreement, comprised of seventy-three Articles in seven Parts, is one of 
the most extensive provisions in the WTO Agreement.  It establishes mandatory standards 
for the protection of various IPRs, including copyrights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, and layout designs of integrated circuits, providing 
substantial minimum terms of their protection (e.g., 50 years for copyright, 20 years for 
patent and indefinite renewal of trademark with the minimum of 7 years for each 
registration).105  In addition to providing effective enforcement procedures under their own 
laws, 106 the TRIPS Agreement also requires Members to apply national treatment and 
MFN treatment for the protection of foreign IPRs.107   Rules of other major IPR 
conventions are also incorporated by reference in the relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
103
 Richard R. Nelson, “The Changing Institutional Requirements for Technological and 
Economic Catch Up,” Columbia University, June 2004 cited in Rodrik (2004), supra note 
65, at 35.
104
 Annex 1C of the WTO Agreement.  WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 3, at 320-353.
105
 WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra
note 3, at 325-339. 
106 Id., at 339-343.
107
 TRIPS Agreement, arts 3 and 4.  Id., at 323-324.
36
Agreement.108
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement as part of trade disciplines raises important 
concerns.  First, the TRIPS Agreement attempts to establish a regulatory regime to protect 
IPRs within all WTO Members, including those whose economic and social developments 
do not yet embrace the concept of IPRs and whose judicial systems have not yet developed 
enough to recognize and enforce IPRs.109  It is doubtful that the imposition of an economic 
and legal system such as an IPR regime should be the role of trade disciplines.  Their role 
should be limited to remedying trade injury resulting from IPR violations where such 
injury has been demonstrated.  The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO, 
primarily for the effectiveness of enforcement, is not a desirable precedent. 
The imposition of an IPR regime may prematurely set economic and legal barriers to 
acquiring advanced technology for their development.110  This concern is amplified 
because the current TRIPS provisions require long durations of IPR protections.111  One 
may argue that the protection of IPRs provides an incentive for creations and innovations 
108
 The Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention 
(1961) and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (1989) are 
incorporated by reference.  Id., at 322-339.
109
 A historical study shows that IPRs began to be recognized and protected when 
considerable economic and social developments had taken place. Chang, supra note 77, at 
83-85.
110 In addition, concern was raised that the compliance requirement of the TRIPS 
Agreement will impose a considerable financial burden on developing countries, 
particularly LDCs. According to a study, implementing the TRIPS obligations would 
require “the least developed countries to invest in buildings, equipment, training, and so 
forth that would cost each of them $150 million— for many of the least developed 
countries this represents a full year’s development budget.”  J. Michael Finger, “The 
WTO’s Special Burden on Less Developed Countries” (2000) 19(3) Cato Journal 435.
111 Supra note 105.
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which may contribute to economic development, but in today’s world where technological 
gaps between developed and developing countries are wider than ever, developing 
countries can close this gap by relying on their own “creativity” alone,112 and they need 
access to advance knowledge and technology.  In this respect, developing countries today 
are at a considerably larger disadvantage than those in the past when there was no 
international IPR regime imposed on them, certainly not to the extent imposed by the 
TRIPS Agreement today.    
While the trade effect of IPR violations may need to be addressed, the imposition of an IPR 
regime clearly and unnecessarily impedes the development interest of developing 
countries.  On the other hand, the need to acquire advance knowledge and technology on 
the part of developing countries does not mean that developed countries have to give up 
their IPR interests entirely.  Alternative provisions that enable developed countries to apply 
trade sanctions where they demonstrate that a violation of their IPR has led to significant 
injury to their trade but not those that attempt to establish an IPR regime throughout the 
world can be considered. 113 In the meantime, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
112 On the other hand, if a developing country considers that the extensive protection of 
IPRs is in their own interest, this country, rather than the WTO, should be trusted to set its 
own standards for the protection under their own laws and regulations.  Y.S. Lee, 
Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, supra note 1, chapter 5.
113 The general exceptions of Article XX already allow trade sanctions to protect IPRs.
What seems necessary is to set detailed rules for the substantive and procedural 
requirements for the application of a trade measure to remedy injury cased by an IPR 
violation.  A Member should be authorized to apply trade measures only where a violation
of its IPRs causes injury to its domestic industry through trade.  An injury test, such as the 
one found in Article 4.2(a) of the Safeguards Agreement, should be required to ensure that 
the measure is applied based on a reasonable assessment of injury caused by IPR violations 
and not on an arbitrary determination by national authorities. This way, developed 
countries will be able to protect their own IPR interests by applying their own laws as well 
as the rules of relevant international IPR conventions, without imposing regulatory burden 
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should be suspended in favor of developing countries to the extent that it imposes on these 
countries the establishment of an IPR regime. 
f. Extension of Special Treatment for LDCs
Some developed countries have offered preferential treatment to LDCs greater than that 
provided under the existing Generalized System of Preference (preferential tariff rates in 
favor of qualifying developing countries: GSP) scheme.  For instance, the European Union 
has recently introduced the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) initiative, offering duty-free and 
quota-free treatment to products currently exported by LDCs.114 Other countries, such as the 
United States and Canada, offer similar preferential treatment to LDCs although less 
comprehensive and more limited in scope than the EBA initiative.115  Considering the dire 
economic need of LDCs, an EBA type of duty-free and quota-free treatment to the trade of 
LDCs needs to be implemented into the WTO by developed countries and participating 
developing countries.  In implementing this initiative in favor of LDCs, a transitional period 
can be set for the complete removal of trade barriers to sensitive products.116  Members 
on developing countries such as the one currently imposed by the TRIPS Agreement.  Y.S. 
Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, supra note 1, chapter 5.
114
 For an initial evaluation of the EBA initiative, see Paul Brenton, “Integrating the Least 
Developed Countries into the World Trading System: The Current Impact of European 
Union Preferences Under ‘Everything But Arms’” (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 623-
646.
115
 For instance, the United States has recently implemented the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act which offers improved access to certain African, but not Asian, LDCs. Id., 
at 644-645.
116
 In the EBA initiative, trade liberalization is complete except for three products, fresh 
bananas, rice, and sugar where tariffs will be gradually reduced to zero (in 2006 for 
bananas and 2009 for rice and sugar). Duty-free tariff quotas for rice and sugar will be 
increased annually. Id., at 625.
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should also ensure that non-tariff measures do not undermine the trade benefit of these 
preferences for LDCs.117
B. The Role of the Council for Trade and Development
The remainder of this section considers the role of the Council for Trade and Development 
proposed earlier.  The primary objective of the new Council is to set a development agenda 
and promote development interests in the trading system. Its role can include i) the 
promotion of a development agenda and the implementation of trade-related development-
assistance policies ii) regulatory monitoring concerning development, and iii) instituting 
and supervising development-assistance activities, including those of sub-committees.    
a. Development- Assistance Policy Implementation
The Council should create a regulatory environment in the trading system that allows and 
facilitates the implementation of effective development policies by developing country 
Members.  In doing so, the Council should identify problems and gaps in the current 
trading system in facilitating development and accordingly set a trade and development 
agenda on a regular basis.  This agenda may be discussed in the Ministerial Conferences 
and trade rounds to improve a more development-supportive regulatory system and modify 
relevant rules, if necessary.  In promoting a trade and development agenda, the Council 
should cooperate with relevant international bodies such as the United Nations Committee 
117
 It has been observed that non-tariff measures, as well as stringent rules of origin, 
continues to limit exports from LDCs significantly.  Inama (2002), “Market Access for 
LDCs: Issues to Be Addressed” (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 115. Applications of 
administered protection, such as anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and 
safeguards, can also diminish the beneficial effect of preference for LDCs.  
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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO).  Through such cooperation, the trade and development agenda set 
by the WTO would be promoted throughout the world more effectively and consistently. 
In addition, a mechanism should be devised for developed country Members and 
participating developing country Members to file a mandatory Trade-Related Development 
Assistance Report (“TDAR”) on a regular basis, which reports the activities of Members in 
compliance with the trade and development agenda set by the Council.  The Council 
should receive and examine TDARs on a regular basis and be in consultation with relevant 
Members to discuss their development-assistance activities.  The Council and developed 
country Members may agree on specific commitments to be fulfilled by the developed 
country Members to promote the trade and development agenda and the Council may 
further examine, within a certain time period, whether these commitments are met.
The point of this proposal is to have a independent Council to set a relevant trade and 
development agenda on a regular basis and through the reporting mechanism, impose 
specific commitments on each developed and participating developing country Members to 
assist with development.  The enforceability of these commitments may be questioned, as 
the WTO may not always be able to apply effective sanctions against the violating 
Members.  The authorization of retaliatory measures may not be an effective sanction if 
these developing countries do not have leverage against the violating developed country 
Members.  Nonetheless, Council activities to identify the relevant trade and development 
agenda and the reporting mechanism in the trading system to identify and monitor 
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Members’ specific obligations in the trading system will still promote development 
interests.  Since the implementation of the WTO, Members have largely complied with the 
specific obligations imposed by the WTO even without the threat of sanctions.
b. Regulatory Monitoring 
The Council should also monitor compliance of development-assistance WTO provisions, 
including the existing S&D provisions, GATT Articles XXXVI ~ XXXVIII, and the 
provisions of the suggested ADF.  Part of these monitoring elements can be incorporated in 
the aforementioned TDAR.  Violations of these provisions should be reported to the 
Council if the violation is detrimental to the trade interest of a developing country Member. 
Then the Council should be subsequently in consultation with the violating Member to 
seek a resolution.  The commitments on the part of developed country Members in GATT 
Articles XXXII can be monitored by the TDAR.  Compliance with these commitments 
may require a more broad policy adjustment by the developed country Member, which may 
necessitate the monitoring by the Council.  The Council should publish an annual report on 
the compliance status of these development-assistance provisions and provide a check 
against any systematic compliance problem.  The Council should include such a problem in 
the trade and development agenda for possible rule modification.  
c. Instituting and Supervising Sub-Committees
The Council should institute either standing or ad-hoc sub-committees to address specific 
issues of trade and development that require long-term attention, such as technological 
transfer between developed and developing country Members.  There should be at least one 
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sub-committee specifically devoted to the problems of LDCs and another assisting with 
building capacities of developing countries to participate fully in the trading system and 
realize the benefit.  Assistance should be provided to developing country Members 
involved in costly and time-consuming trade disputes, and the current WTO Advisory 
Centre118 should be expanded to offer assistance to every developing country Member in 
need of assistance with respect to the panel or Appellate Body proceedings.  Consideration 
should be given as to whether it would serve the need of developing country Members to 
assign the function of the existing WTO Advisory Centre to a sub-committee under the 
Council for Trade and Development.
IV. Conclusion – Development Assistance: From Rhetoric to Action
To facilitate development effectively in trade disciplines, it is important to examine the 
current institutional apparatus and regulatory structure of development-assistance 
provisions in the WTO.  The current Committee on Trade and Development and the
development assistance provisions scattered throughout the GATT/WTO disciplines are not 
sufficient to meet this objective.  Regulatory and organizational reforms are thus necessary 
to effectively meet the development agenda and implement development-assistance 
policies.  This reform should include the elevation of the CTD to the new Council on Trade 
and Development and the establishment of a coherent body of rules that facilitate 
development (ADF).  
118 Supra note 45.
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The proposed expansion of the current organizational apparatus means an expansion of 
staff and an increase in resources available to assist with developing countries.  As of 2004,
the current WTO budget of 1.36 million Swiss (roughly USD 1.18 million) francs for 
technical cooperation and of 4.29 million Swiss francs (USD 3.72 million) for training 
would be inadequately low to meet this proposal.  Financial assistance from some 
Members has allowed trade ministers and representatives from developing countries to 
participate in WTO meetings and negotiations.  Financial assistance necessary to enable 
participation of developing countries should not be left to the generosity of individual 
Members, but should be provided systematically by the WTO. The WTO Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law should also be supported by the WTO budget. The WTO budget allocation 
to the activities and functions of trade and development should be significantly increased to 
meet these needs. 
Logistics need to be improved to address the needs arising from the limited financial and 
human resources of developing countries.  The scarcity of these resources often prevents 
developing countries from participating in the trade organization fully; so, WTO meetings 
and negotiations schedules should also be set to allow the maximum participation of 
developing countries.119 The use of modern technology, such as web-technology, should be 
adopted to increase participation of developing countries which cannot afford to station 
experts in Geneva to participate in these meetings, without having to travel to Geneva from 
119
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their home countries.  The lack of participation by developing countries in WTO processes 
has been often pointed out as a reason for the poor representation of the interests of 
developing countries, thus ways to relieve these difficulties, such as the proposals made 
above, should be sought.
The monitoring and enforcement mechanism of the development-assistance provisions and
policies should also be devised.  The requirement of a Trade-Related Development 
Assistance Report can be considered.  Developed country Members should be required to 
make this Report on a regular basis, subject to the review of the Council for Trade and 
Development.  Willing developing country Members may also participate in this reporting 
process on a voluntary basis. This Report requirement will be consistent with the objectives 
of development facilitation manifested in the Part IV of the GATT.  The proposed 
organizational and regulatory reform, as well as this suggested improvement of practical 
logistics, would help to turn what many have doubted as merely “rhetoric for development-
assistance” into real and effective actions to assist developing countries.
